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ABSTRACT
Defense against Buffer Overflow Attack by Software Design Diversity
by
Kunal Metkar
Dr. Yoohwan Kim, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of Computer Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
A buffer overflow occurs during program execution when a fixed-size buffer has had 
too much data copied into it. This causes the data to overwrite into adjacent memory 
locations, and, depending on what is stored there, the behavior of the program itself 
might be affected.
Attackers can select the value to place in the location in order to redirect execution to 
the location of their choice. If it contains machine code, the attacker causes the program 
to execute any arbitrary set of instructions—essentially taking control of the process. 
Successfully modifying the function return address allows the attacker to execute 
instructions with the same privileges as that of the attacked program.
In this thesis, we propose to design software with multiple variants of the 
modules/functions. It can provide strong defense against the buffer overflow attack. A 
way can be provided to select a particular variant (implementation) of the module 
randomly when software is executed. This proves to be useful when an attacker designs 
the attack for a particular variant/implementation which may not be chosen in the random 
selection process during execution. It would be much difficult for the attacker to design
111
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an attack because o f the different memory (stack -frame) layout the software could have 
every time it is executed.
IV
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Buffer and Buffer Overflow
A buffer is simply a contiguous block of computer memory that holds multiple 
instances of the same data type. C programmers normally associate ‘arrays’ with the 
word buffer. Most commonly, character arrays. Arrays, like all variables in C, can be 
declared either static, i.e. allocated at load time on the data segment, or dynamic i.e. 
allocated at run time on the stack. To overflow is to flow or fill over the bounds. Here, we 
are referring overflow of dynamic buffers, otherwise known as stack-based buffer 
overflows.
A buffer overflow occurs during program execution when a fixed-size buffer has had 
too much data copied into it. This causes the data to overwrite into adjacent memory 
locations, and, depending on what is stored there, the behavior of the program itself 
might be affected [1].
During program execution, when a function is called, a “stack frame” is allocated for 
a function storing function arguments, return address, previous frame pointer, and local 
variables. Figure 1 show s the ‘stack fram e’ i.e. the memory layout w hen  the function is 
called. We can see three logical areas o f memory corresponding to program code - 
instructions, data and stack [1].
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1.2 Buffer Overflow Attacks
Each function prologue pushes a stack frame onto the top o f the stack, and each 
function epilogue pops, or deallocates, the stack frame currently on top o f the stack. The
high end of memory
) I
PC
low end of memory
Figure 1 Memory Layout o f a Stack Frame after a Function Has Been Called
return address in the frame points to the next instruction to execute after the current 
function returns. This storage and retrieval o f  the address o f the next instruction on the 
stack introduces a vulnerability that allows an attacker to cause a program to execute 
arbitrary code.
To illustrate how this might happen, consider the following C function: 
void samplefint a, int b) { 
char buffer[96];
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strcpy(buffer, large_string);
retum(l);
}
If an overflow occurs when strcpy() copies the result from Targe string’ into the local 
variable ‘buffer’, the copied data continues to be written toward the high end of memory 
(higher up in the figure), eventually overwriting other data on the stack, including the 
stored return address (RA) value. Overwriting causes function sample() to return 
execution to whatever address happens to lie in the RA storage location. In most cases, 
this type of corruption results in a program crash (such as a “segmentation fault” or “bus 
error” message). However, attackers can select the value to place in the return address in 
order to redirect execution to the location of their choice. If it contains machine code, the 
attacker causes the program to execute any arbitrary set of instructions— essentially 
taking control of the process [1].
A buffer overflow usually contains both executable code and the address where that 
code is stored on the stack. The data used to overflow is often a single string constructed 
by the attacker, with the executable code first, followed by enough repetitions of the 
target address that the RA is overwritten.
This attack strategy requires the attacker to know exactly where the executable code 
is stored; otherwise, the attack will fail. Attackers get around this requirement by 
prepending a sequence of unneeded instructions (such as NOP) to their string. Prepending 
a sequence creates a “ramp” or “sled” leading to the executable code. In such cases, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
modified RA needs to point only somewhere in the ramp to enable a successful attack. 
While it still takes some effort to find the proper range, an attacker needs to make only a 
close guess to be able to hit the target.
Successfully modifying the return address allows the attacker to execute instructions 
with the same privileges as that o f the attacked program. If  the compromised program is 
running as root, the attacker might use the injected code to spawn a super-user shell and 
take control o f  the machine [1].
This can be best explained by following figures. Figure 2.a illustrates the address 
space o f a process undergoing buffer overflow attack.
Oxbffffffc 
bottom of stack
stack buffer 
growth growth
fram e pointer-»
s ta c k  p o i n t e r s
env. vars
param eters
return addr
orev. frame pti
stack vars
param eters 
return addr
prev. frame ptr
!juffer[96]
stack 
frame 0
stack  
V frame for 
mainO
Stack ad d ress  space
instruction
p o in te r
void maln() { 
char buffer[961;
BtrcDytbuffer, large_string): 
return
execu ted  co d e  seg m en t
Figure 2.a Address Space before the Attack
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}
executed code segment
Figure 2.b After Injecting the Attack Code
Figure 2.b shows the memory layout o f the stack ft-ame after return address has 
been overwritten by the address o f the attack code, during execution o f the statement: 
‘strcpy(buffer,large_string);’, it instruments the stack to alter the execution path [3].
Figure 2.c shows how control goes to ‘attack code’ after following ‘nop sled’. 
Generally attack code would normally come from an environment variable, user input or 
fi'om network connection. A successful attack on a privileged process would give the 
attacker an interactive shell with the user-ID o f root i.e. root shell [3].
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Figure 2.c Executing Attack Code
In recent years, attacks that exploit huIFer overflow hugs have accounted for 
approximately half o f all reported CERT [2] advisories. Figure 3 shows the increase in 
the number o f reported CERT security advisories that are based on buffer overflow.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW OF PREVENTION STRATEGIES AGAINST BUFFER
OVERFLOW ATTACKS
2.1 Vulnerability Prevention Techniques
For security-minded application developers, as well as for end users, extensive 
research has focused on tools and techniques for preventing (and detecting) buffer 
overflow vulnerabilities. Techniques are categorized into four basic groups— static 
analysis, compiler modifications, operating system modifications, and hardware 
modifications—that can often be combined to provide a layered approach to the problem.
2.1.1 Static Analysis
One of the best ways to prevent the exploitation of buffer overflow vulnerabilities is 
to detect and eliminate them from the source code before the software is put to use, 
usually by performing some sort of static analysis on either the source code or on the 
compiled binaries.
2.1.1.1 Source Code Auditing
A proven technique for uncovering flaws in software is source code review, also 
known as source code auditing. Among the various efforts along these lines, the best 
known is the OpenBSD project [10]. Since 1996, the OpenBSD group has assigned as 
many as 12 volunteer developers to audit the source code of the free, BSD-based 
operating system. This analysis requires much time, and its effectiveness depends on the
8
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expertise of the auditors. However, the payoff can be noticeable, as reflected in the fact 
that OpenBSD has one of the best reputations for security and historically the lowest rates 
of remote vulnerabilities, as calculated by the statistics of reported vulnerabilities [1] (via 
postings to the BUGTRAQ mailing list [11]).
Tools designed for automatic source code analysis complement manual audits by 
identifying potential security violations, including functions that perform unbounded 
string copying. Some of the best-known tools are ITS4 [12], iLfliS” [14] and LCLint [4], 
An extensive list of auditing tools is provided by the Sardonix portal at 
sardonix.org/Auditing_Resources.html.
Most buffer overflow vulnerabilities are due to the presence of unbounded copying 
functions or unchecked buffer lengths in programming languages like C. Table 1 enlists 
some of the unsafe functions in C [3].
Function Prototype Potential Problem
strcpy (char *dest, const char *src) May overflow the ‘desF buffer
strcat (char *dest, const char *src) May overflow the ‘dest’ buffer
getwd (char *buf) May overflow the ‘b u f buffer
gets (char *s) May overflow the ‘s’ buffer
fscanf (FILE * stream, const char * form at, May overflow its arguments
scanf (const char * form at, ..........) May overflow its arguments
realpath (char *path , char resolved_path[ ] 
)
May overflow the ‘path’ buffer
sprintf (char *str , const char * form at, ... ) May overflow the ‘str’ buffer
Table 1 Partial List of Unsafe Functions in the Standard C Library
2.1.1.2 Lexical Technique: pscan
pscan is a simple tool for automatically scarming source code for format string 
vulnerabilities, pscan searches the input source code for lexical occurrences of function
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
calls syntactically similar to, e.g., sprintf(buffer, variable). The main advantages of 
lexical analysis are that it is extremely fast, it can find bugs in non-preprocessed source 
files, and it is virtually language independent.
2.1.1.3 Proper Handling of Type Qualifiers
The basic framework for type qualifiers, where format string vulnerabilities are 
detected with type qualifiers, is used for finding Y2K bugs in C programs. Improved 
handling o f casts and variable-argument functions; the notation for polymorphic type 
signatures; and the improved user-interface are some of the benefits of this technique.
2.1.1.4 Use of Safe Programming Languages
One way to prevent programs from having such vulnerabilities is to write them using 
a language (such as Java or Pascal) that performs bound checking. However, such 
languages often lack the low level data manipulation needed by some applications. 
Therefore, researchers have produced “more secure” versions of C that are mostly 
compatible with existing programs but add additional security features. Cyclone [5] is 
one such C-language variant. Unfortunately, the performance cost of bounds checking 
(reported in [5]) involves up to an additional 100% overhead.
These solutions assume the analyst has access to and can modify a program’s source 
code. However, this assumption does not hold in all circumstances (such as in legacy 
applications and commercial software). A technique described in [6] makes it possible to 
rewrite an existing binary to keep track of return addresses and verify they have not been 
changed without needing the source code. The worst reported overhead of this technique 
was 3.44% in [6] for instrumenting Microsoft PowerPoint.
10
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2.1.2 Compiler Modifications
If the source code is available, a developer can add buffer overflow detection 
automatically to a program by using a modified compiler; four such compilers are 
StackGuard, ProPolice, StackShield, and Return Address Defender (RAD). One 
technique for preventing buffer overflow attacks is a modified C language compiler that 
automatically inserts detection code into a program when compiled.
2.1.2.1 StackGuard
StackGuard [7] detects direct attacks against the stored RA by inserting a marker 
(called a canary) between the frame pointer and the return address on the stack. Before a 
function returns, the canary is read off the stack and tested for modification. The 
assumption made by the compiler (or designer of the modified compiler) is that a buffer 
overflow attack is detectable, because in order to reach the stored address, it had to first 
overwrite the canary. Stack-Guard uses a special fixed value (called a terminating canary) 
composed of the four bytes—NULL, CR, LF, and EOF—most commonly used to 
terminate some sort of string copy. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for attackers to 
insert this value as part of their exploit string; such attacks are thus easily detected.
2.1.2.2 ProPolice Compiler
The ProPolice compiler (also known as the stack smashing protector, or SSP [8], 
protects against direct attacks with a mechanism similar to Stack-Guard. In addition, 
ProPolice reorders the memory locations of variables, so pointers are below arrays and 
pointers from arguments are before local variables. Having pointers below arrays helps 
prevent indirect attacks; having pointers from arguments before local variables makes it 
more likely that a buffer overflow will be detected.
1 1
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2.1.2.3 StackShield
StackShield is a Linux security add-on (an assembler file preprocessor) that works 
with the gcc compiler to add protection from both direct and indirect buffer overflow 
attacks [9].It operates by adding instructions during compilation that cause programs to 
maintain a separate stack of return addresses in a different data segment. It would be 
difficult or impossible for an attacker to modify both the return address in the stack 
segment and the copy in the data segment through a single unbounded string copy. 
During a function return, the two values are compared by the inserted function epilogue; 
an alert is raised if they do not match.
StackShield also provides a secondary protection mechanism: implementing a range 
check on both function call and function return addresses. If a program attempts to make 
a function call outside a predefined range or if a function returns to a location outside that 
range, then the software presumes an attack has taken place and terminates the process. 
This termination trigger mechanism also allows software to protect against function 
pointer attacks.
2.1.2.4 RAD
RAD [13] is a patch to gcc that automatically adds protection code to the prologues 
and epilogues of function calls. It stores a second copy of return addresses in a repository 
(similar to StackShield), then uses operating system-memory-protection functions to 
detect attacks against this repository. RAD either makes the entire repository read-only 
(causing significant performance degradation) or marks neighboring pages as read-only 
(minor overhead but avoidable by an indirect attack).
12
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2.1.3 Operating System Modifications
Several protection mechanisms operate by modifying some aspect of the operating 
system. Because many buffer overflow attacks take place by loading executable code 
onto the stack and redirecting execution there, one of the simpler approaches to defending 
against them is to modify the stack segment so it is non-executable. This prevents 
attackers from directing control to code they have uploaded into the stack. However, an 
attacker can still direct execution to either code uploaded in the heap or to an existing 
function (such as system() in libc). Most Unix-like operating systems have an optional 
patch or configuration switch that removes execute permissions from the program stack.
2.1.3.1 Libsafe
A library modification called Libsafe [3] intercepts all calls to functions known to be 
vulnerable and executes a “safe version” of the calls. The safe versions estimate an upper 
limit for the size of the target buffer. Since it is highly unlikely that a program would 
deliberately overwrite a frame boundary, copies into buffers are bounded by the top of 
the frame in which they reside. Libsafe doesn’t require the recompilation of programs.
2.1.3.2 OpenBSD
Perhaps the most comprehensive set of changes to an operating system for detecting 
and preventing buffer overflows was introduced in May 2003 in the release of OpenBSD 
J .J  (www.openbsd.org/33.html). The developer first modifies binaries to make it more 
difficult for an attacker to be able to exploit a buffer overflow in any system program. 
The changes combine stack-gap randomization with the ProPolice compiler to make it 
more difficult for scripted attacks to succeed; detection capabilities were also added. 
Second, a developer modifies the memory segments allocated by the operating system to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
remove execute permissions from as many places as possible and ensure that no segment 
is both writable and executable when in user mode. These memory-segment changes 
made it much more difficult for attackers to find code to run that is already present and 
impossible for attackers to upload their own.
Microsoft has been pushing its in-house developers to perform source-code auditing 
and use automated bounds-checking tools. It announced that beginning with Service Pack 
2 fo r Windows XP  (August 2004), a number of security protections would be built into 
the operating system, including making memory non-executable on newer processors and 
buffer length checks in system programs [20].
2.1.3.3 ‘Proof-carrying code’ Technique
Other security-related programming techniques are based on restricting a program’s 
control flow. Although they are not designed to detect buffer overflow attacks, they 
mitigate their effects by restricting what can be executed after an attack takes place. 
Proof-carrying code is one such technique [21]; binary programs are bundled with a 
machine-verifiable “proof’ of what the program is going to do. As the program executes, 
that behavior is observed by a security monitor and compared against the proof by a new 
addition to the operating system kernel. Any deviations are noticed by the monitor (which 
might be in the kernel), and the program can be killed.
2.1.3.4 ‘Program shepherding’ Technique
It requires the verification of every branch instruction and verifies they match a given 
security policy. It is done by restricting where executable code can be located in memory, 
restricting where control transfers (such as jump, call, and return) can take place, along 
with their destinations, and adding “sandboxing,” or access restrictions, on other
14
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operations. Shepherding is for the MIT-run Runtime Introspection and Optimization 
operating system on IA-32 platforms (www.cag.lcs.mit.edu/rio/). Its reported worst-case 
performance on SPEC2000 benchmarks was over 70% on Linux and 660% on Windows 
NT [16] [17].
2.1.4 Hardware Modification
Any technique that performs buffer overflow detection will exact a performance cost 
from the system employing it. One way to reduce execution time is to move operations 
from software to hardware ,thus, able to execute the same operations possibly tens or 
hundreds of times faster.
2.1.4.1 SmashGuard
The SmashGuard [18] proposal uses a modification of the micro-coded instructions 
for the CALL and RET opcodes in a CPU to enable transparent protection against buffer 
overflow attacks. SmashGuard takes advantage of the fact that a modem CPU has 
substantial memory space on the chip and creates a secondary stack that holds return 
addresses similar to the return address repository employed by StackShield. Unlike 
StackShield, the SmashGuard modifications to the CPU microcode make it possible to 
add protection without having to modify the software.
The CALL instruction is modified such that it transparently stores a copy of the return 
address on a data stack within the processor itself. The RET instruction compares the top 
of the hardware stack with the address to which the software is trying to redirect 
execution back to. If the two values do not match, the processor raises a hardware 
exception that causes the program to terminate in the general case. While this 
modification is not fabricated into a CPU, it has been implemented on an architecture
15
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simulator. Application performance was degraded by 0.02%—  two orders of magnitude 
better than StackGuard and four orders better than StackShield. Additionally, the system 
properly handles TODO issues (such as context switches, setjmp()/longjmp(), and CPU 
stack spillage).
2.1.4.2 Split Stack and Secure Return Address Stack (SAS)
SAS [19] involves a two pronged approach in which programs are compiled to utilize 
two software stacks, one for program data, one for control information. This should make 
it more difficult for an overflow of a data variable to affect the stored control information. 
The performance cost for this approach, as reported in [19], varies from 0.01% to 
23.77%, depending on the application being tested.
A variation of the Split Stack software modification is a Secure Return Address Stack 
(SRAS) stored on the processor. The SRAS stores all return addresses after a CALL 
instruction, using it for the next RET instruction. Theoretically, this storage method 
should prevent a buffer overflow from changing the return address (possibly decreasing 
the effects) but would not actually detect or prevent the occurrence of any buffer 
overflow. However, a number of implementation issues (such as setjmp()/longjmp()) 
must still be worked out concerning SRAS implementation.[l]
Table 2 summarizes some of the techniques with respect to their implementations and 
performance criteria [24].
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Technique for 
Defending 
Against 
Procedure 
Return 
Address 
Corruption
Required Changes Provides 
Protection 
Against 
BO that 
Corrupts 
Addresses
Applies 
to Many 
Platfor­
ms
Applica­
tion
Code
Size
Increase
Adverse
Perfor­
mance
Impact
Source
Code
Compiler OS Processor
Safe
Programming
Languages
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Can be 
high
Can be 
high
Static Analysis 
Techniques
Yes No No No No Yes Varies Varies
StackGuard No Yes No No N o Yes Low Modera­
te
StackGhost N o No Yes No Yes No None Low
Libsafe No No Yes No No Yes Low Low
Libverify No No Yes No Yes Yes High Modera­
te
SRAS No No Yes Yes Yes Yes None Low
Table 2 Summary of Prevention Strategies
Table 3 summarizes effectiveness of some of the detection techniques [3].
Instrumentation Technique
None Eibsafe Libverify StackGuard Janus Non-
Execut-
able
Stack
Effectiveness (what types o f errors are handled?)
Kernel Errors No No Yes Yes No Yes
Specification
Errors
No Yes Yes Yes May be May be
Implementa­
tion Errors
No May be Yes Yes May be May be
User Code 
Errors
No No Yes Yes May be May be
Other Characteristics
Performance
Overhead
None Very Low Medium Medium Medium None
Disk Usage 
Overhead
None Very Low Very Low Low Very
Low
None
Source Code 
Needed
No No No Yes No No
Ease o f Use — Very Easy Very Easy Medium Easy-
Medium
Easy-
Medium
able 3 Summary of Detection Technique Characteristics
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2.2 Limitations of Prevention Strategies [25]
2.2.1 Current Limitations of Advanced Static Analysis for C and C++
Static analysis of a quality beyond that available in tools like ITS4 can have a 
tremendous impact on C and C++ software security. But there are several problems, 
however, which make a practical tool involving such technology difficult.
2.2.1.1 C’s Liberal Nature Makes the Language Poorly Suited for Static Analysis.
The general laxness of the C language (e.g., arbitrary pointer arithmetic and gotos)
makes many types of static analysis intractable in the worst case [22]. In the average 
case, C’s heavy reliance upon pointers makes any sophisticated analysis very difficult.
2.2.1.2 The Added Complexities of C++ Make It Very Difficult to Analyze.
Though recent research on static analysis has made some headway into performing 
useful analyses on object-oriented languages in general, C++ suffers because it is both 
object-oriented and derived from C. Currently, object-oriented analysis techniques are 
cutting-edge research; performing an accurate analysis in an environment with classes, 
dynamic dispatch and templates is a large challenge.
2.2.1.3 Static Analysis in a Multi-threaded Environment Is Difficult.
Multi-threaded applications are quite popular on Windows platforms and are
becoming ever-more popular on Unix-based systems. Unfortunately, the potential for 
interaction of data between threads must be considered by any analysis tool that wishes to 
be correct.
2.2.1.4 Better Static Analysis Is Less Efficient.
ITS4 [12], which performs a very simple analysis, analyzes about 9000 lines of code 
per second on a Pentium-90. For sendmail-8.9.3, it took an average of 5.9 seconds of
18
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CPU time to scan the entire package, and never more than 7.5 seconds of wall-clock time. 
This and many such static analysis techniques that use constraint solving, to try to 
determine which buffers could potentially overflow, and by how much, ignores control 
flow information as well as context.
Thus it could take several years of solid effort to produce a robust, precise, portable, 
and, most importantly, practical tool that does an excellent job of statically analyzing 
source for security vulnerabilities.
2.2.2 Limitations with Libsafe Library
Library modifications add protection for only a subset of functions and only in 
dynamically linked programs. Many security-critical applications are compiled statically, 
making it possible in some instances for a determined attacker to bypass the modified 
libraries [26].
2.2.3 Limitations with Lexical Analysis Techniques
One of the lexical analysis technique pscan operates only on the lexical level, it 
cannot reason about the flow of values through the program and fails in the presence of 
wrappers around C libraries, pscan also cannot distinguish between safe calls when the 
format string is a variable and unsafe calls— it flags any call where a format string is non­
constant.
Moreover, as lexical tools have no knowledge of language semantics, many errors— 
such as those involving aliasing or non-local control paths—cannot be detected.
2.2.4 Limitations of Static Bug Detection
Many authors have noted that static analysis can be a useful tool for detecting bugs. 
For instance, LCLint [23] uses dataflow analysis to search for common errors in C
19
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programs; however, they are not well suited to detecting format string vulnerabilities, for 
two reasons. First, they focus primarily on local properties, whereas format string 
vulnerabilities often arise due to global mishandling of strings. Second, many of them 
(e.g., ESC and, to a lesser degree, LCLint) require extensive annotations from the user.
2.2.5 Limitations of Run Time Techniques
FormatGuard, a compiler modification, injects code to dynamically check and reject 
all printf-like function calls where the number of arguments does not match the number 
o f “%” specifiers. Of course, only applications that are re-compiled using FormatGuard 
will benefit from its protection. Also, one technical shortcoming of FormatGuard is that it 
does not protect user-defined wrapper functions [27].
Moreover, a common limitation of both libformat and FormatGuard is that programs 
with format string vulnerabilities remain vulnerable to denial of service attacks.
2.2.6 Hardware Implementation Issues
Hardware implementation has always been cumbersome because of implementation 
cost and the architecture specific applicability.
2.3 Way Towards Software Diversity
Despite the diverse nature of these potential solutions, no silver bullet is available for 
solving the problem of attacks against stored return addresses, and attackers have a long 
history of learning how to circumvent detection and prevention mechanisms. Some of the 
more effective techniques involve training and review, but even the best-trained 
individuals make mistakes. Dynamic protection techniques can be costly in terms of 
overhead, but some researchers are trying to move that functionality into faster.
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hardware-based protection schemes. As these techniques move from academic 
laboratories into mainstream software releases, computer users and software developers 
have become aware of what they can do, and what they can’t do [1]. Framework is 
required to have more general approach in the sense that we can construct defense against 
any attacker capability that can be varied across variants of software systems.
Many security researchers have noted that the current computing monoculture leaves 
our infrastructure vulnerable to a massive, rapid attack. One mitigation strategy that has 
been proposed is to increase software diversity. By making systems appear different to 
attackers, diversity makes it more difficult to construct exploits and limits an attack’s 
ability to propagate. Several techniques for automatically producing diversity have been 
developed. Flere, we are going to refer some of the important techniques [28].
2.3.1 N-Variant Systems
Most of the techniques producing diversity such as rearranging memory and randomizing 
the instruction set depend on keeping certain properties of the running execution secret 
from the attacker. Typically, these properties are determined by a secret key used to 
control the randomization. If the secret used to produce a given variant is compromised, 
an attack can be constructed that successfully attacks that variant.
Moreover, the diversification secret may be compromised through side channels, 
insufficient entropy, or insider attacks. Artificial diversity is a new way that does not 
depend on keeping secrets: instead of diversifying individual systems, single system 
containing multiple variants (designed to have disjoint exploitation sets) may be 
constructed. Figure 4 illustrates the framework. Entire server can be referred as an N- 
variant system [28].
21
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The system shown in Figure 4 is a 2-variant system, framework can be generalized to 
any number o f variants. The polygrapher takes input from the client and copies it to all 
the variants. The original server process P  is replaced with the two variants, PO and P I. 
The variants maintain the client-observable behavior o f P  on all normal inputs. They are, 
however, artificially diversified in a way that makes them behave differently on abnormal 
inputs that correspond to an attack o f a certain class. The monitor observes the behavior 
o f the variants to detect divergences which reveal attacks. When a divergence is detected, 
the monitor informs all other variants through a signal and restarts the variants in known 
uncompromised states.
Input
from
Client r A
\P olygrapher/
Output \ ,
Monitor
\
to 
Client
J
Server
Figure 4 N-Variant System Framework
N-Variant Systems achieves variations by one o f following four techniques [28]
1. Memory Organization
2. Instruction Set Variations
22
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3. Different Scheduler for each Variant
4. Different File Naming Conventions
2.3.1.1 Limitations
• N-Variant system has been implemented only for Apache Server which creates 
separate processes using ‘fork’ system call. Each child process is run as an 
independent N-variant system. But, some servers use user-level threading libraries 
where there are multiple threads within a single process invisible to the ‘monitor’. 
This causes problems in an N-variant system, since the threads in the variants may 
interleave differently to produce different sequences of system calls (resulting in a 
false detection), or worse, interleave in a way that allows an attacker to exploit a 
race condition to carry out a successful attack without detection [28].
• The asynchronous property of process signals makes it difficult to ensure that all 
variants receive a signal at the exact same point in each of their executions. 
Although we can ensure that a signal is sent to all the variants at the same time, 
we cannot ensure that all the variants are exactly at the same point within their 
program at that time. As a result, the timing of a particular signal could cause 
divergent behavior in the variants if  the code behaves differently depending on the 
exact point when the signal is received. This might cause the variants to diverge 
even though they are not under attack, leading to a false positive detection [28].
2.3.2 N-Version Programming and Limitations
N-version programming is defined as the independent generation of N >= 2 
functionally equivalent programs from the same initial specification. It uses several 
independent development groups to develop different implementations of the same
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specification with the hope that different development groups will produce versions 
without common faults. However, N-version programming provides no guarantee that the 
versions produced by different teams will not have common flaws. Indeed, experiments 
have shown that common flaws in implementations do occur [30].
In real-time environment system failure may occur because of performance 
limitations.
• In still other cases a long sequence of outputs may not lend itself to be specified in 
a specific order. In these cases, the outputs from the component versions cannot 
be readily compared [30].
• In some situations sequence of outputs from a version is context-dependent. Any 
error that pushes the rest of output off its proper position makes the subsequent 
comparison of results meaningless [30].
2.3.3 Automatic Patch Generation, TXL and Limitations
Automatic Patch generation has been suggested as one of the promising techniques 
for tackling buffer overflow attacks [31]. The system consists of Attack/worm sensors, a 
correlation engine, sandboxed environment. Analysis and patch-generation engine and 
software update component. Armed with the vulnerability information produced 
ProPolice [8], the system invokes TXL [32] to transform the code. TXL is a hybrid 
functional and rule-based language which is well-suited for performing source-to-source 
transformation and for rapidly prototyping new languages and language processors.
Basically, there are few fixes that might be effected by TXL.
• Moving the offending buffer to the heap, by dynamically allocating the buffer 
upon entering the function and freeing it at all exit points.
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• Add code that recognizes either the attack itself or specific conditions in the 
stack trace (e.g., a specific sequence of stack records), and returns from the 
function if it detects these conditions.
• Attempt of “slice-off’ some functionality, by immediately returning from 
mostly-unused code that contains the vulnerability.
2.3.3.1 Limitations
Automatic patch generation technique has several challenges such as [31]
• Determination of the nature of the attack (e.g. buffer overflow), and identification 
of the likely software flaws that permit the exploit.
• This helps to generate potential fixes for several classes of buffer overflows using 
code-to-code transformations and test them in a clean-room environment. Further 
research is necessary in the direction of automated software recovery in order to 
develop better repair mechanisms
• system assumes that the source code of the instrumented application is available 
so patches can be easily generated and tested
2.3.4 Code Encryption: PointGuard
The PointGuard [33] approach randomizes (encrypts) stored pointer values. The 
encryption is achieved by xor'ing pointer values with a random integer mask generated at 
the beginning of program execution. It has many of the benefits (such as broad protection 
against a wide range of pointer-related attacks) and weaknesses (susceptibility to attacks 
that read victim process memory to identify the mask).
However, PointGuard does not protect against attacks that do not involve pointer 
values, e.g., attacks that modify security-critical data through a buffer overflow, also.
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probability of successful attacks is smaller with PointGuard as it is dependent on the 
availability of accurate type information [29]. Many C-language features, such as the 
ability to operate on untyped buffers, functions that take untyped parameters, unions that 
store pointers and integer values in the same location, can make it difficult or impossible 
to get accurate type information, which means that the corresponding pointer value(s) 
cannot be protected.
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CHAPTER 3
DEFENSE BY SOFTWARE DESIGN DIVERSITY
3.1 Inspiration and Approach
Along the trend of software diversity as the emerging technique to defend memory 
related attacks, address obfuscation is thought to be one of the most successful 
techniques. Address obfuscation [29] is a program transformation technique in which a 
program's code is modified so that each time the transformed code is executed; the virtual 
addresses of the code and data of the program are randomized.
The PaX [34] project has also developed an approach for randomizing the memory 
regions occupied by program code and data, called Address Space Layout Randomization 
(ASLR). Rather than viewing address obfuscation as a program transformation, they view 
it as an operating system feature. In particular, they have modified the Linux kernel so 
that it randomizes the base address o f different sections of memory, such as the stack, 
heap, code, and memory-mapped segments. A key benefit of this approach is that it 
requires no changes to individual applications (other than having the compiler generate 
position-independent code). However, since the approach incorporates no analysis of the 
applications, it is difficult to perform address randomizations beyond changes to the base 
addresses of different memory segments. Moreover, the ASLR approach does not provide 
protection against data attacks that exploit relative distances between variables.
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A program transformation approach will permit randomization of the locations of 
individual variables and routines within these memory sections. Such randomization 
makes it difficult to carry out attacks that rely on relative distances between variables to 
modify critical data, e.g., a string used as an argument to ‘execve’ function. Moreover, it 
introduces significant additional diversity into the program, as it is no longer possible to 
craft attacks by knowing just the offsets in the base address of various memory segments.
3.2 Our Approach
This thesis approach has been mainly inspired from the concept of address and 
program obfuscation, N-Variant system framework and N version programming. It 
considers the limitations of these approaches and aims to produce more general solution 
for all kinds of memory related attacks.
In this concept, every program is analyzed for all possible outflows. For each flow of 
the program, functionality is implemented by the use of various modules. Every exiting 
module is studied to implement in all possible different ways. All feasible solutions with 
respect to time and space complexity find the implementations in the final code.
In short, each module in a program is thought and implemented in different ways. 
Every possible ‘run’ of the applications chooses different path across the variations of the 
module.
It can be best visualized as shown in figure 5. When control flow enters a function it 
can choose any of the existing paths across the different variations of the module.
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3.2.1 Random Flow Selection Process
Random path selection could be decided by any random number generation technique 
such as system clock time with modulo operation on number of existing variations for a 
module. Somehow strategy should be devised for it should not repetitively select the 
same variation.
Random
ExChoice
Module
Variants
Module
Variant!
Module 
Variant 1
Function Exit
Function Entry
Figure 5 Control Flow through Different Variants of the Module
3.2.2 Generation of Variants
Attacks that exploit relative distances between objects, such as attacks that overflow 
past the end of a buffer to overwrite adjacent data that is subsequently used in a security- 
critical operation, can be rendered difficult by a random permutation of the order in
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which the variables appear. Such permutation makes it difficult to predict the distance 
accurately enough to selectively overwrite security-critical data without corrupting other 
data that may be critical for continued execution o f the program.
Hence, modules can be varied in their implementation if  we change the order o f stack 
variables/local variables in stack frame. We can also change the order o f static variables. 
Introducing dummy variables is also one good option. Generally, decision can be made 
depending on space and time trade-off. By this method, we require less efforts(changes) 
to produce variations.
This ensures that each o f the variant will have different offset for ‘function return 
address’. Hence, an address dependent attack which could succeed against one variant 
will surely not succeed against the variant. This can be best understood by Figure 6, 
representing stack frames for two variants o f  a module. Clearly, these frames have 
different offsets (from stack base) for ‘Return Address’ and ‘Previous frame pointer’.
S t a c k
G r o w t h
Param eters 1 . . .  N Para m eters  1 . .N +  m
Return A ddress A Return A ddress B
Stack (local) variable Stack (local) variable
1 . . . N 1. . .  N +  p
Figure 6 Stack Frames for Variants o f a Module
As shown in Figure 7, if  we change the order o f variants (modules) in control flow of 
a program (as shown in Figure 5), we can effectively randomize the addresses o f the
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routines and relative distances between them. This makes it difficult for the attacker to 
develop successful attacks even after knowing the offset o f  each routine from the base 
address.
Oxwmib
boMomofaacIi
slack bufkf
growth gnowm
frame pointer-*
stack pointer-*
env vars
parameters
return atJar
prev frame pti
saa*as
parameters
return addr
prev frame ptr
stack vars
parameters
reiumaaor
prev. ftameptr
stack 1
L Stack frame 
for function 1
OxMMb
IxiifomofNack
stack buffer 
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Stack frame 
for function .A
frame pointer-*
stack pointer-*
Stack frame 
for functions
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parameters
return addr
prev, frami pi 
stack va 5
parameters
reitfnaddf
prev frame pir
stack vars
parameters
return addr
prev frame ptr
stack vars
I Stack frame 
for function 1
Stack frame for 
function IB
Stack frame 
for function 3
stack address space stack address space
Figure 7 Stack Address Space (Memory Layout) When One Variant Is Replaced by
Another
3.2.3 Strategy Design Pattern and Variants
In our approach to implement software design diversity we have also used strategy 
design pattern for the flexibility it provides to the program with respect to addition and 
removal o f  variations during run time.
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3.2.3.1 Strategy Design Pattern
Strategy Pattern is intended to define a family o f  algorithms, encapsulate each one, 
and make them interchangeable. Strategy lets the algorithm vary independently from 
clients that use it [36].
General implementation structure o f a strategy pattern can be visualized in the form 
o f UML (Class) diagram as shown in Figure 8.
Context strategy
O
+ContextlnterfacB() +Algofithml nte rfaceO
ConcreteStrategyA C oncreteStrategyB ConcreteStrategyC
+Algorithm) n terfacei ) +Algorithm lnterfacei) +Algorithm) n terface( )
Figure 8 Structure for Strategy Design Pattern
Participants:
The classes and/or objects participating in this pattern are
• Strategy (Base class for all variants/strategies)
It declares an interface common to all supported algorithms. Context uses this 
interface to call the algorithm defined by a ConcreteStrategy
• Concrete Strategy (A Variant)
It implements the algorithm using the Strategy interface
• Context
1) This class is configured with a ConcreteStrategy object
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2) It maintains a reference to a Strategy object
3) It may define an interface that lets Strategy access its data [36].
Collaborations:
• Strategy and Context interact to implement the chosen algorithm. A context may pass 
All data required by the algorithm to the strategy when the algorithm is called.
• A context forwards requests from its clients to its strategy. Clients usually create and 
pass a ConcreteStrategy object to the context; thereafter, clients interact with the 
context exclusively. There is often family of ConcreteStrategy class for a client to 
choose from each of which implements strategy interface [36].
3.2.3.2 Strategy Pattern Implementation for the Approach
In our implementation of strategy pattern following are the classes:
1) Client : main program
2) Strategy : CFunctionsStrategy class
3) Context : CServer class
4) ConcreteStrategy : CAddFunctionsStrategy class
• Main program creates and passes the CAddFunctionsStrategy object 
(*m_pAddFunctionsStrategy) to context class CServer
• When client calls functions BindListenOnServerSock() and 
ReceiveDataOnClientSockQ their implementation for CAddFunctionsStrategy 
class is referred.
3.2.3.3 Variation with Strategy Pattern
Figure 9 shows the exact model for the implementation with strategy design pattern.
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Figure 9 Control Flow through Different Variants of the Module with Strategy Selector
3.2.3.4 Benefits of Using Strategy Pattern
• By the use of strategy pattern we can define different module variants in different 
classes/subclasses (i.e. encapsulate each one) use them interchangeably
• We can also use the knowledge of past attacks on the system to decide which 
variants to modify, change or add to the existing systems.
• There can be some variations for a module which can have different time and space 
complexity. With strategy pattern in place, ‘Client’ (main-calling program) can use 
them interchangeably depending on current time and space trade-offs.
• Moreover, strategy pattern helps to move the implementation code for different 
variants (strategies) from ‘client’ (main-calling program) to ‘strategy’ class which
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could act as base class for different variations (strategies). This way ‘client’ -  code 
size remains within limits and is unaffected by addition and removal o f different 
variants.
3.3 Assumptions for the Technique
1) Extraction of accurate control-flow graphs can be challenging for some routines 
hence transformation is applied to only those routines for which accurate control flow 
graphs can be extracted.
2) Only functions which have suitable behavior are instrumented. In particular, the 
function must have at least one local variable and manipulate the stack in a standard 
fashion in order to be instrumented. Moreover, the routines should be free of non­
standard operations that reference memory using relative addressing with respect to 
the frame pointer.
3.3.1 How It Is ‘Different’ from Address Obfuscation Technique?
Address obfuscation technique achieves diversity through randomization of base 
address of the stack, base address of heap, starting address of dynamically linked libraries 
and introduction of random gaps between objects. Moreover, it focuses on delaying the 
transformation to the latest possible stage as it is performed on object files ( i.e. at link­
time) and executables.
It permutes the order of routines in shared libraries or the routines in executables and 
hence address obfuscation technique runs through the following limitations 
• Safe rewriting of machine code is not always possible.
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• Stack-frame padding requires a rewrite of all routines in program and libraries 
which becomes a challenge when some lines can not be accurately analyzed.
3.4 Limitations of Our Approach
• Common to Address Obfuscation Technique
1) It can not provide defense against all memory error exploits, but is instead a 
probabilistic technique which increases the amount o f work required before an 
attack (or sequence of attacks) succeeds. Hence, it is critical to have an 
estimate of the increase in attacker work load.
• Other Limitations
2) Replacement or insertion of small number of variables wont be much efficient 
in bringing about effective variation as the offset achieved with respect to 
direct address won’t be much.
3) Success of this technique against buffer overflow attack would be totally 
dependent on number of variants and thus number variations we can achieve 
for a module.
3.5 Benefits of Our Approach
1) With this approach, routines will have different stack-frame layout everytime 
program is run.
2) For variations of the modules, randomized shuffling of variables and insertion of 
some dummy variables inside modules gives different relative spacing between
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program elements. This renders buffer overflow attacks unsuccessful as they can 
be ‘absolute- address dependent attacks’ or ‘relative address-dependent attacks’.
3) As it gives different memory layout for stack frames everytime, attackers are 
forced to make many attempts on average before attack could success (depends on 
number of variants we can produce for a module). Each unsuccessful attack 
causes target program to crash which in turn increases the chances of detecting 
the attack.
4) Attack that succeeds against one variant will not succeed against another variant 
or even for a second time against the same variant, which is likely to happen for 
different executions of the program.
5) Many control flows through the program code makes the attack much more 
difficult as it would need to succeed against each of the module variants on the 
program flow which could be rare.
6) This approach can be implemented effectively with low runtime overheads with 
minimum modification as compared to other techniques which require compilers, 
interpreters to be modified, binary rewriting.
7) As this approach is based on program transformations compared to other 
techniques which require operating system modifications, it can be ported to 
different operating systems.
8) It could protect against a wide range of other memory related attacks such as 
Code Red, Integer overflow
9) Adding and removing variations at run time is very easy with the added approach 
of strategy design pattern which lends us flexibility of adding new variant to the
37
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existing ones without any major changes to the existing code. This is even more 
useful to replace those variants against which attack has proved to be successful at 
least once.
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CHAPTER 4
SOFTWARE DESIGN DIVERSITY IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
4.1 Demonstration of the Concept
Concept implementation is shown with the example of a client-server application. In 
the ‘server’ application there are two character arrays declared; ‘b u f and ‘Message’, 
‘b u f has 2000 bytes, while ‘Message’ is allocated 5000 bytes. ‘Message’ receives the 
data from the client and passes the result to the function ‘pr’ which copies the message to 
the character array buf. Since the size of ‘b u f (2000) is smaller than the size of 
‘Message’ (5000) and since strcpy is used to copy data from the character array Message 
to buf, it is possible for us to perform a buffer overflow.
‘Client’ attempts to connect to a remote host - ‘server’ on any given port and tries to 
send a string to the remote server. As we know, the server can accept up to 5000 bytes of 
data, but when it performs a strcpy, if  the data is more than 2000 bytes, it will crash the 
application.
To test this we used 32 bit machine with Windows XP Service Pack 2 Operating 
System installed. We sent message to the server with length more than 2000 bytes. First 
2000 ‘A ’s were sent followed by consecutive four ‘B’s followed by consecutive 4 ‘C’s 
and so on. These letters were sent in packs of four in order to detect at what address 
server crashes. After many attempts, it was found that server crashed at location 
corresponding to ‘IIJJ’ for the following input:
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‘2000 ‘A ’s + BBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIJJJJ ’
At this time ‘Instruction Pointer’ pointed to location ‘0x49494A4A’ i.e. program 
execution went to that address. Here, 0x49 is the hex representation of I and 0x4A is the 
hex representation of J.
• Exploit
This means if we know the address of the ‘exploit routine’ running in current dll’s 
linked to vulnerable application (server), we can execute it by overflowing the above 
‘server’ application. All we have to do is to find out the ‘characters’ from the ascii table 
which have hex values corresponding to the address of the ‘exploit routine’. We can send 
these characters in the message to the server at the position of ‘IIJJ’. After ‘server’ 
application crashes program control goes to our ‘exploit routine’.
Here, we have defined exploit routine and using debugger inside ‘Microsoft Visual 
Studio 2003’ we found out its address to be ‘0x0040101e’. A message (length >2000) 
was sent to the server containing the characters corresponding to the above address. 
When server crashed control went to the exploit routine which runs netcat utility on the 
attacked system and I can now take control of the target system.
Thus we are simulating buffer overflow attack with exploit code as part of original 
program. By this method, attacker can exploit any critical code residing in original 
program. It can be any function performing some critical operations, some driver 
program.
• Defense
Defense is provided by implementation of different variants of some of the modules. 
Variation is achieved by randomly reshuffling the module variables, insertion of dummy
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variables etc. Some o f the called and calling functions were also reshuffled to achieve 
stack structure randomization. Strategy design pattern implementation makes it easy to 
select, add or change any variant at any time with minimal changes to the original code.
• Results
Figure 10 ‘Server’ In Listen Mode
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Figure 11 ‘Client’ Sending Large Message to Server
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Figure 12 Server Hacked by Executing Netcat Utility
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Figure 13 Client Takes Control o f Server (Attacked) System
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c C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
Figure 14 When Attacked Program Is Closed, Attacker Looses the Control
g
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Figure 15 Server Crashes When Buffer Overflow Attack Fails
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Figure 16 Failed Buffer Overflow Attack When Client Is Unable to Take Control o f the
System
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusions
A technique is proposed to constrain Buffer Overflow Attacks and other memory 
related attacks. Software design diversity is aimed at randomizing elements in a stack 
frame i.e. stack variables, function parameters etc. Different variants are produced for a 
module and are placed and selected randomly in a program flow to ensure randomness in 
addresses (offsets) of functions inside stack address space. Inclusion of strategy design 
pattern ensured flexibility to add, change or remove any of the existing module variants 
from the original code with small modifications. During each program execution since 
different variants are chosen it would be difficult for the attacker to devise the attack and 
even if he is able to devise for one variant he would have to start over from scratch for 
next program execution. This could prove to be very effective solution to combat the 
spread of worms and viruses.
5.2 Future Work
With the addition of ‘intelligence’ to the system - implementing software design 
diversity approach - with respect to successful or failed attack attempts, we can eliminate 
vulnerable variants from the program flow during run time. With network in place, 
knowledge of failure of the variants could be propagated to all the systems.
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APPENDIX I
Dec HxOct Char Dec Hx Oct Html Chr Dec Hx Oct Html Chr Dec Hx Oct Html Chr
0 0 000 MtTL n u l l ) 32 20 040 s#32 Space 64 40 100 «#64 0 96 60 140 «#96;
1 1 001 3 OH s t a r t  o f  h e ad ing ) 33 21 041 «#33 ! 65 41 101 «#65 A 97 61 141 «#97; a
2 2 002 3T>; s t a r t  o f  t e x t ) 34 22 042 «#34 66 42 102 «#66 B 98 62 142 «#98; b
3 3 003 ETX end o f  t e x t ) 35 23 043 «#35 .# 67 43 103 «#67 0 99 63 143 «#99; c
4 4 004 EOT end o f  t ra n s m is s io n ) 36 24 044 «#36 9 68 44 104 «#68 D 100 64 144 «#100 d
5 5 005 EHQ e n q u iry ) 37 25 045 «#37 % 69 45 105 «#69 E 101 65 145 «#101 e
6 6 006 ACK acknow ledge) 38 26 046 «#38 70 46 106 «#70 F 102 66 146 «#102 f
1 7 007 EEL b e l l ) 39 27 047 «#39 71 47 107 «#71 C 103 67 147 «#103 g
a 8 010 BS backspace) 40 28 050 «#40 ( 72 48 110 «#72 H 104 68 150 «#104 h
9 9 O i l TAB h o r iz o n ta l  ta b ) 41 29 051 «#41 ) 73 49 111 «#73 I 105 69 151 «#105 i
10 A 012 LF HL l i n e  fe e d , new l in e ) 42 2A 052 «#42 * 74 4A 112 «#74 J 106 6A 152 «#106 1
11 B 013 ',T v e r t i c a l  ta b ) 43 2B 053 «#43 + 75 4B 113 «#75 K 107 6B 153 «#107 k
12 C 014 FF NP fo rm  fe e d , new page) 44 2C 054 «#44 , 76 4C 114 «#76 L 108 60 154 «#108 i
13 D 015 CR c a r r ia g e  r e tu rn ) 45 2D 055 «#45 - 77 4D 115 «#77 H 109 6D 155 «#109 m
14 E 016 SO s h i f t  o u t) 46 2E 056 «#46 78 4E 116 «#78 11 110 6E 156 «#110 n
15 F 017 31 s h i f t  in ) 47 2F 057 «#47 / 79 4F 117 «#79 0 111 6F 157 «#111 Û
16 10 020 DIE d a ta  l i n k  escape) 48 30 060 «#48 0 80 50 120 «#80 P 112 70 160 «#112 p
17 11 021 DCl d e v ic e  c o n t r o l  1) 49 31 061 «#49 1 81 51 121 «#81 Q 113 71 161 «#113 q
18 12 022 DC2 d e v ic e  c o n t r o l  2) SO 32 062 «#50 2 82 52 122 «#82 R 114 72 162 «#114 E
19 13 023 DC3 d e v ic e  c o n t r o l  3) 51 33 063 «#51 3 83 53 123 «#83 S 115 73 163 «#115
20 14 024 DC4 d e v ic e  c o n t r o l  4) 52 34 064 «#52 4 84 54 124 «#84 T 116 74 164 «#116 t
21 15 025 MAK n e g a t iv e  acknow ledge) 53 35 065 «#53 5 85 55 125 «#85 U 117 75 165 «#117 U
22 16 026 SYH synch ronous id le ) 54 36 066 «#54 6 86 56 126 « # 8 6 V 118 76 166 «#118 V
23 17 027 ETB end o f  t ra n s .  b lo c k ) 55 37 067 «#55 7 87 57 127 «#87 TJ 119 77 167 «#119 TJ
24 18 030 CAH c a n c e l) 56 38 070 «#56 8 88 58 130 «#88 X 120 78 170 «#120 X
25 19 031 EH end o f medium) 57 39 071 «#57 9 89 59 131 «#89 y 121 79 171 «#121 y
26 lA 032 SUB s u b s t i t u te ) 58 3A 072 «#58 90 5A 132 «#90 122 7À 172 «#122
27 IB 033 ESC escape) 59 3B 073 «#59 91 SB 133 «#91 [ 123 7B 173 «#123 /
28 1C 034 FS f i l e  s e p a ra to r ) 60 30 074 «#60 < 92 50 134 «#92 124 70 174 «#124 1
29 ID 035 OS group s e p a ra to r ) 61 3D 075 «#61 = 93 5D 135 «#93 ] 125 7D 175 «#125 }
30 IE 036 RS re c o rd  s e p a ra to r) 62 3E 076 «#62 94 5E 136 «#94 126 7E 176 «#126 •-
31 IF 037 US u n i t  s e p a ra to r ) 63 3F 077 «#63 ? 95 5F 137 «#95 127 7F 177 «#127 DE
S o u rc e :  m vw .LookupTableo.com
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APPENDIX II 
// Implementations
// Client Implementation
// client, cpp : Defines the entry point for the console application.
/He
create a TCP socket (client socket) 
create a hostent structure 
resolve ip address 
if successful 
then
create another socket with socket_ in (essentially server socket) 
copy the contents of the hostent into new socket
*/
#include <iostream>
#include <winsock.h>
//load windows socket
#pragma comment/ lib, "wsock32.1ib")
//Define Return Messages 
#define CS ERROR 1 
#defme CS OK 0
//Usage Function 
void usage/ char *name)
{
printf/" usage: %s <Server Host> <Server Port> <Message To Be Sent>\n\n", name);
}
//Error Function 
void sError/ char *str)
{
MessageBox/ NULL, str, "Client Error" ,MB_OK);
WSACleanupO;
}
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int main( int argc, char **argv) 
{
//Declarations 
char* server IP; 
unsigned short serverPort;
WORD version;
version = MAKEWORD( 1,1);
W SAD ATA wsaData;
if( argc != 4)
{
usage/ argv[ 0]); 
return CS ERROR;
}
//wsock32 initialized/ started up for usage 
WSAStartup/ version,&wsaData) ;
//Create Socket 
SOCKET clientSocket;
clientSocket = socket/ AF_INET, SOCK STREAM, 0);
if( clientSocket == INVALID SOCKET)
{
sError/" Socket error!"); 
closesocket/ clientSocket);
WSACleanupO; 
return CS ERROR;
}
struct hostent *srv_ptr;
//gethostbyname returns a pointer to hostent/ a structure which store information 
about a host)
srv_ptr = gethostbyname/ argv[l]);
if/ srv__ptr == NULL )
{
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sError/" Can't resolve name.");
WSACleanup/); 
return CS ERROR;
}
struct sockaddr in serverSocket;
serverIP = inet ntoa /*/struct in addr *)*srv_ptr->h_addr_list); 
serverPort = htons/ u short/ atoi/ argv[2])));
serverSocket. sin_family = AF INET; 
serverSocket. sin addr. s addr = inet addr/serverIP); 
serverSocket. sin_port = serverPort;
//Attempt to connect to remote host
if /connect/ clientSocket, /struct sockaddr *)&serverSocket,sizeof 
/serverSocket)))
{
sError/" Connection error."); 
return CS ERROR;
}
// Send data on successful connection, note no limit on argv[ 3] 
send/ clientSocket, argv[3], strlen/ argv[3]), 0);
printf/"\nMessage SentXnConnection Closed.\n"); 
closesocket/ clientSocket);
WSACleanup/); 
return CS_OK;
}
// Vulnerable Server Implementation 
#include <stdio.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <winsock.h>
#include <windows.h>
//load windows socket
#pragma comment/ lib, "wsock32.1ib")
//Define Return Messages 
#defme SS_ERROR 1 
#define SS OK 0
void pr/ char *str) 
{
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charbufl2000]=""; 
printf("\n%s ”,str); 
strcpy(buf,str);
}
void sError( char *str)
{
MessageBox (NULL, str, "socket Error" ,MB_OK);
WSACleanupO;
}
// Function hacked prints out a string to the console, is not called 
// anywhere and note it exits using exit function, which exits the 
// whole program, not just the function hacked, 
int hacked/ void)
{
MessageBox/NULL,"You are Hacked!!", "Hacked...", MB_IC ON WARNING ); 
char *str = "nc -1 -p 7777 -e cmd";
WinExec/str,l);
exit/1);
}
int main/ int argc, char **argv)
{
if / argc != 2)
{
printf/"\nUsage: %s <Port Number to listen on.>\n", argv[0]); 
return SS ERROR;
}
WORD sockVersion;
WSADATA wsaData;
int rVal;
char Message[5000]=""; 
charbuf[2000]="";
u short LocalPort;
LocalPort = atoi/ argv[l]);
//wsock32 initialized for usage 
sockVersion = MAKE WORD/ 1,1);
WSAStartup/ sockVersion, &wsaData);
//create server socket
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SOCKET serverSocket = socket/ AF_INET, SOCK STREAM, 0);
if/ serverSocket == INVALID SOCKET)
{
sError/" Failed socket/)"); 
return SS ERROR;
}
SOCKADDR_IN sin;
sin. sin_family = PF INET;
sin. sin_port = htons/ LocalPort);
sin. sin addr. s addr = INADDR ANY;
//bind the socket
rVal = bind/ serverSocket, /LPSOCKADDR)& sin, sizeof/ sin)); 
if/ rVal == SOCKETERROR)
{
sError/"Failed bind/)");
WSACleanup/); 
return SS ERROR;
}
//get socket to listen
rVal = listen/ serverSocket, 10);
if/ rVal == SOCKETERROR)
{
sError/'Tailed listen/)");
WSACleanup/); 
return SS ERROR;
//wait for a client to connect 
SOCKET clientSocket;
clientSocket = accept/ serverSocket, NULL, NULL); 
if/ clientSocket == INVALID SOCKET)
{
sError/" Failed accept/)");
WSACleanup/); 
return SS ERROR;
}
int bytesRecv = SOCKETERROR; 
while/ bytesRecv == SOCKET ERROR )
{
//receive the data that is being sent by the client max limit to 5000 bytes.
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bytesRecv = recv( clientSocket, Message, 5000, 0 );
if( bytesRecv == 0 || bytesRecv == WSAECONNRESET ) 
{
printf/ "\nConnection Closed.\n"); 
break;
}
}
//Pass the data received to the function pr 
pr/Message);
//close client socket 
closesocket/ clientSocket);
//close server socket 
closesocket/ serverSocket);
WSACleanup/);
return SS_OK;
}
// Server Implementing design diversity with strategy pattern
// Server
#include <stdio.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <winsock.h>
#include <windows.h>
#include "FunctionsStrategy.h" //header file implementing a strategy
//load windows socket
#pragma comment/ lib, "wsock32.1ib")
//Define Return Messages and constants
#defme SS ERROR 1
#defme SS_OK 0
#defme IMin 0
#define IMax 3
//Context class to use the strategy 
class CServer 
{
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private :
//This serves as the pointer to 'concrete strategy'
//It can be base class of all concrete strategies (though not necessary) 
CAddFunctionsStrategy * m_p AddF unctions Strategy;
public:
SOCKET serverSocket;
SOCKET clientSocket;
int LocalPort;
char message [5 000];
SOCKET GetServerSocketO
return serverSocket;
SOCKET GetClientSocketO 
return clientSocket;
int GetLocalPortO 
return LocalPort;
char* GetMessageO 
return message;
void SetServerSocket/SOCKET p serverSocket) 
serverSocket = pserverSocket;
void SetClientSocket/SOCKET p clientSocket) 
clientSocket = pclientSocket;
void SetLocalPort(int p localPort)
LocalPort = plocalPort;
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CServerO
{
m_pAddFunctionsStrategy = NULL; 
for(int i=0;i <5000;i++)
{
message[i]= '\0';
}
}
int BindListenOnServerO; 
int ReceiveOnClientO;
//This method allows to change the strategy by just changing the object/class 
// by this we can change functions layout and achieve stack randomization anytime 
//we want
Void S et AddF unctions Strategy ( CAddFunctionsStrategy *p_AddF unctionsStrategy) ; 
CAddFunctionsStrategy* GetFunctionsStrategy();
CAddFunctionsStrategy* CServer::GetFunctionsStrategy()
{
if(m_pAddFunctionsStrategy ! =NULL)
{
return m_pAddFunctionsStrategy;
}
else
{
printf("Pointer NULL"); 
return NULL;
void CServer ;;SetAddFunctionsStrategy(CAddFunctionsStrategy 
* p A d d F  unctionsStrategy)
{
m_pAddFunctionsStrategy = pAddFunctionsStrategy;
}
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int CServer;;BindListenOnServer()
{
m_pAddFunctionsStrategy-> BindListenOnServerSock (&serverSocket,&LocalPort); 
return 0;
}
int CServer::ReceiveOnClient()
{
m_pAddFunctionsStrategy->ReceiveDataOnClientSock(&clientSocket,message); 
return 0;
}
void pr( char *str)
{
char buf[2000]=""; 
printf("\n%s ",str); 
strcpy(buf,str);
}
void sError( char *str)
{
MessageBox (NULL, str, "socket Error" ,MB_OK); 
WSACleanupO;
}
int BindListenOnServerSock(CServer *serverObj)
{
int rVal;
if( serverObj->GetServerSocket() == INVALID SOCKET)
{
sError(" Failed socket()"); 
return SS ERROR;
SOCKADDR IN sin;
sin.sin_family = PF INET;
sin.sin_port = htons( serverObj ->GetLocalPort()) ;
sin. s in ad d r. s a d d r  = INADDRANY ;
//bind the socket
rVal = bind( serverObj->GetServerSocket(), (LPSOCKADDR)&sin, sizeof( sin)); 
if( rVal == SOCKET ERROR)
{
sError("Failed bind()");
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WSACleanupO; 
return SS ERROR;
}
//get socket to listen
rVal = listen( serverObj->GetServerSocket(), 10); 
if( rVal == SOCKETERROR)
{
sError("Failed listenO");
WSACleanupO; 
return SS ERROR;
}
}
// Function hacked prints out a string to the console, is not called 
// anywhere and note it exits using exit function, which exits the 
// whole program, not just the function hacked, 
int hacked( void)
{
MessageBox(NULL,"Graceful Crash!","Failed Attempt...",MB_ICONWARNfMG); 
char *str = "nc -1 -p 7777 -e cmd";
WinExec(str,l);
exit(l);
}
void ReceiveDataOnClientSock(CServer * serverObj)
{
int bytesRecv = SOCKET ERROR; 
while( bytesRecv == SOCKET ERROR )
{
//receive the data that is being sent by the client max limit to 5000 bytes. 
bytesRecv = recv( serverObj->GetClientSocket(), serverObj->GetMessage(),5000,0);
if( bytesRecv == 0 || bytesRecv == WSAECONNRESET )
{
printf( "\nConnection Closed.\n"); 
break;
}
}
//Strategy Client calling different strategies 
int main( int argc, char **argv)
{
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CServer serverObj;
CAddFunctionsStrategy *addFunctStrategyObj = NULL; 
int bytesRecv = SOCKET ERROR; 
int rVai=0;
if  ( argc != 2)
{
printf("\nUsage: %s <Port Number to listen on.>\n", argv[0]); 
return SS ERROR;
}
WORD sockVersion;
WSADATA wsaData;
SOCKET clientSock;
//wsock32 initialized for usage 
sockVersion = MAKEWORD( 1,1);
WSAStartup( sockVersion, &wsaData);
//u_short LocalPort;
serverObj. S etLocalPort(atoi (argv [ 1 ] )) ;
//create server socket
SOCKET serverSock = socket( AF_INET, SOCK STREAM, 0); 
serverObj.SetServerSocket(serverSock);
int choice = 0;
choice = IMin + rand() % (IMax - IMin);
switch(choice)
{
case 1:
addFunctStrategyObj = serverObj.GetFunctionsStrategyO;
serverObj .BindListenOnServer();
clientSock = accept(serverObj.serverSocket, NULL, 
NULL);
serverObj. SetClientSocket(clientSock);
if( serverObj.GetClientSocketO == INVALID SOCKET) 
{
sError("Failed acceptQ");
WSACleanupO;
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return SS ERROR;
}
serverObj .ReceiveOnClient(); 
break;
case 2:
if( serverObj.GetServerSocketO == INVALID SOCKET) 
{
sError(" Failed socket()"); 
return SS ERROR;
}
SOCKADDR_IN sin;
sin. sinfam ily  = P F IN E T  ;
sin. sin_port = htons( serverObj.GetLocalPortO);
sin. s inaddr. s a d d r  = INADDR ANY ;
//bind the socket
rVal = bind( serverObj.GetServerSocketO, 
(LPSOCKADDR)& sin, sizeof( sin)); 
if( rVal == SOCKET_ERROR)
{
sError("Failed bindO");
WSACleanupO; 
return SS ERROR;
}
//get socket to listen
rVal = listen( serverObj.GetServerSocketO , 10); 
if( rVal == SOCKET ERROR)
{
sError("Failed listenO");
WSACleanupO; 
return SS ERROR;
}
clientSock = accept(serverObj.serverSocket, NULL, 
NULL);
serverObj.SetClientSocket(clientSock);
if( serverObj.GetClientSocketO == INVALID SOCKET) 
{
sError(" Failed acceptO");
WSACleanupO;
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return SS ERROR;
}
while( bytesRecv == SOCKET ERROR )
{
//receive the data that is being sent by the client max limit 
//to 5000 bytes. 
bytesRecv = recv( serverObj.GetClientSocketQ , 
serverObj.GetMessageO , 5000, 0 );
if( bytesRecv == 0 || bytesRecv == WSAECONNRESET ) 
{
printf( "\nConnection Closed.\n"); 
break;
}
}
break;
case 3 :
BindListenOnServerSock(&serverObj);
clientSock = accept(serverObj.GetServerSocketO , NULL, 
NULL);
serverObj.SetClientSocket(clientSock);
if( serverObj.GetClientSocketO == INVALID_SOCKET)
{
sError(" Failed acceptO");
WSACleanupO; 
return SS ERROR;
}
ReceiveDataOnClientSock(&serverObj ) ; 
break;
default:
clientSock = accept(serverObj.GetServerSocketO , NULL,
NULL);
exit(O);
}
//Pass the data received to the function pr
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pr(serverObj .GetMessageO);
//close client socket
closesocket(serverObj.GetClientSocketO);
//close server socket
d o  sesocket(serverObj. GetS erver Socket()) ; 
WSACleanupO;
return SS_OK;
}
//Strategy Class
• // FunctionsStrategy.h file
#include <stdio.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <winsock.h>
#include <windows.h>
//load windows socket
#pragma comment( lib, "wsock32.1ib")
//Define Return Messages 
#define SS ERROR 1
class CAddFunctionsStrategy 
{
public:
CAddFunctionsStrategyO;
int BindListenOnServerSock(SOCKET *p_serverSocket,int *p_localPort); 
int hackedO;
void ReceiveDataOnClientSock(SOCKET *p_clientSocket,char 
*p_message);
};
• // FunctionsStrategy.cpp file
#include "FunctionsStrategy.h"
CAddFunctionsStrategy :: CAddFunctionsStrategyO 
{
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//Do nothing constructor
}
int CAddFunctionsStrategy: :BindListenOnServerSock(SOCKET *p_serverSocket,int 
*p_localPort)
{
int rVal;
if( *p_serverSocket == INVALID SOCKET)
{
MessageBox (NULL,"Failed socket()", "socket Error" ,MB_OK);
WSACleanupO; 
return SS ERROR;
}
SOCKADDR_IN sin; 
sin.sin family = PF INET ; 
sin.sin_port = htons(*p_localPort); 
sin. s in ad d r. s a d d r  = INADDRANY;
//bind the socket
rVal = bind( *p_serverSocket, (LPSOCKADDR)&sin, sizeof( sin)); 
if( rVal =:=: SOCKET_ERROR)
{
MessageBox (NULL,"Failed bind()","socket Error" ,MB_OK);
WSACleanupO; 
return SS ERROR;
}
//get socket to listen
rVal = listen( *p_serverSocket, 10);
if( rVal == SOCKET ERROR)
{
MessageBox (NULL,"Failed listen()", "socket Error" ,MB_OK);
WSACleanupO; 
return SS ERROR;
}
int CAddFunctionsStrategy: : hacked( void) 
{
char *str = "nc -1 -p 7777 -e cmd"; 
WinExec(str,l); 
exit(l);
}
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void CAddFunctionsStrategy:: ReceiveDataOnClientSock(SOCKET 
*p_clientSocket,char *p_message)
{
int bytesRecv -  SOCKET ERROR; 
while( bytesRecv == SOCKETERROR )
{
//receive the data that is being sent by the client max limit to 5000 bytes. 
bytesRecv = recv( *p_clientSocket, p message, 5000, 0 );
if( bytesRecv == 0 || bytesRecv == WSAECONNRESET )
{
printf( "\nConnection Closed.\n”); 
break;
}
}
65
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Graduate College 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Kunal Metkar
Home Address:
1455 E Rochelle Avenue,
Apt # 4
Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 
Degrees:
Bachelor of Computer Engineering, 2004 
Pune University, India
Thesis Title: Defense against Buffer Overflow Attack by Software Design Diversity
Thesis Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Dr. Yoohwan Kim, Ph.D.
Committee Member, Dr. Thomas Nartker , Ph.D.
Committee Member, Dr. Kazem Taghva, Ph.D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, Dr. Venkatesan Muthukumar, Ph.D.
66
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
